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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Appellate Case No. 990402-CA
v.
Priority No. 2
RICK KEITH CATES,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment
Eighth District Court
Uintah County, State of Utah
Honorable John R. Anderson
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Rick Keith Cates, Defendant and Appellant, through counsel, appeals his
conviction on one count of burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1973). The court of appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
WITH STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue
The sole issue for review is whether the trial court erred in interpreting the
burglary statute to include the victims' rented trailer, briefly situated in the mountains for
use during the deer hunt, within the meaning of a "dwelling" rather than "building," with
the result that Cates was convicted of second degree not third degree felony burglary.
Standard of Review
The court of appeals reviews the trial court's interpretation of a statute for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determinations. State v. Maguire,
924 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1973).
This statute is reproduced verbatim below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
On November 5, 1998 Cates initially was charged with seven counts: (I)
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203; (II)
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302; (III)
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; (IV) unlawful
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possession or use of a controlled substance, marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I); (V) possession of drug paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l); (VI) purchase,
possession or transfer of a handgun by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a); and (VII) attempted dangerous weapon
penalty enhancement, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.
B. Course of Proceedings
On December 16,1998 Cates had a preliminary hearing. The trial court dismissed
count (VI), purchase, possession of transfer of a handgun by a restricted person.
However, it bound Cates over on, and he denied, the other counts.
On January 27,1999, at a change of plea hearing, Cates admitted to an amended
information charging him with three counts: (I) aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302; (II) burglary of a dwelling, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202; and (III) theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. All other charges were dismissed.
C. Disposition at Trial Court
On April 6, 1999 the trial court sentenced Cates to concurrent terms at the Utah
State Prison as follows: count (I), aggravated robbery, five years to life; count (II),
burglary of a dwelling, one to fifteen years; and count (III), theft, one to fifteen years.
Cates presently is serving his sentence in state prison.
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RELEVANT FACTS
The facts, which Cates does not dispute, may be stated briefly. Early in the
evening of November 3, 1998 Cates and co-defendant Ben Cates, his brother, were
driving in the vicinity of Blue Mountain Road, a remote area on Blue Mountain, inside
Utah near the border with Colorado. They saw a trailer. They stopped, armed
themselves with a shotgun and pistol, and entered the trailer where they encountered
Andrew Sunkees, his wife and a baby. Tr. Preliminary Hearing 6-9. Cates and his
brother questioned the victims about items in their possession and ultimately stole a
muzzle-loader, a hunting knife, and a small amount of money. Id. at 9-12. They then
left. Sunkees immediately used a cellphone, which he had denied having, to call for
help. Id. Police apprehended Cates and his brother on the highway near Blue
Mountain. All the stolen property, along with marijuana and drug paraphernalia, was
recovered in Cates' vehicle. Id. at 49-54.
Sunkees' trailer was a twenty-four foot Mallard with sleeping quarters inside. He
had rented the trailer from a dealer in Vernal and taken it to Blue Mountain for use
during the deer hunt. It had been on site for one full day and night. It was to be returned
to the dealer after the hunt. Id. at 7,18-19.
At the preliminary hearing, Cates, through counsel, attempted inter alia to
persuade the court that Sunkees' trailer was not a dwelling and therefore the burglary
charge should be dismissed. Id. at 58-60. The court rejected this argument, saying that
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because the trailer was used for sleeping it was a dwelling within the meaning of the
burglary statute. Id. at 65-66. At the change of plea hearing, specifically in reference to
count (II), burglary of a dwelling, Cates renewed his claim that the trailer was not a
dwelling. The court allowed him to argue the matter further but, in the end, remained
unconvinced. Tr. Plea Hearing 9-12. As a result, Cates' plea to count (II) was made
conditionally, preserving the right to appeal the trial court's interpretation, pursuant to
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Tr. Plea Hearing 8. Paragraph 23 of
Cates9 affidavit of defendant in advance of guilty plea and agreement also expressly
preserved the right to appeal this particular issue.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A rented trailer, briefly situated in the mountains for use during the deer hunt, is
not a dwelling within the meaning of the burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1973). Arguably, while a dwelling must be used for overnight occupancy, it also must
have the attributes of a home, such as permanency in one location and placement in an
area regularly used for residential purposes. The trailer, in this case, had none of the
attributes of a home and more properly should have been deemed to be a building,
subjecting Cates to less severe punishment. The wording of the statute itself supports
such a view. Also, cases from other jurisdictions hold that trailers are not dwellings and,
for the offense of burglary of a dwelling to lie, the structure involved must be
permanently affixed to the ground or otherwise immobile. Finally, a Utah search and

5

seizure statute, along with search and seizure case law generally, distinguishes trailers
and dwellings and provides a useful analyticalframeworkfor determining when a trailer
can and does rise to the level of a dwelling. Applying theframeworkto this case leads to
the result that the victims' trailer is not a dwelling and should not be regarded as such
under the burglary statute.
ARGUMENT
At issue is whether a rented trailer, briefly situated in the mountains for use during
the deer hunt, is a dwelling within the meaning of the burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-202 (1973). Section 76-6-202 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on
any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it
was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of
the second degree.
"Building" and "dwelling" are not defined in the section. However, they are given some
definition, statutorily, in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (1973):
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning,
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein and
includes:
(a) each separately secured or occupied
portion of the structure or vehicle; and
(b) each structure appurtenant to or
connected with the structure or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually
6

occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or
not a person is actually present.
Judicial interpretation of the burglary statute, specifically where the phrases "building"
and "dwelling" are applied to particular facts, is minimal in this jurisdiction. The case
most in point, State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992), holds that a cabin in the
mountains which is occupied less than fifty percent of the time is a dwelling within the
definition in subsection 76-6-201(2). To date, no appellate court has determined
whether a movable trailer, briefly situated in the mountains for use during the deer hunt,
as opposed to a cabin, permanently located in the mountains for at least part-time
residential living, is a dwelling, or as Cates believes, a building.
In Cox the court of appeals did not deal with the possible significance of the
movability or immovability of a structure, that is, its permanency or lack of permanency
in one location, in deciding whether it was a dwelling. The case involved a mountain
cabin permanently affixed to the ground. The issue that defendant raised was the extent
to which the cabin was occupied. Defendant argued that the cabin that was not "usually
occupied." The victim testified that indeed he spent just two or three days a week at the
cabin. The court rejected defendant's argument and implicitly declined to specify any
period of time that someone must occupy a structure before the structure constitutes a
dwelling. The court instead looked to the purpose for which a structure is used.
If the structure is one in which people typically stay overnight,
it fits within the definition of dwelling under the burglary
statute. ...[0]ur second degree burglary statute is intended
7

to protect people while in places where they are likely to be
living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to protecting
property in buildings such as stores, business offices, or
garages.
Cox, supra, at 662. The cabin, in the facts of the case, was deemed to be a dwelling.
Defendant's second degree burglary conviction was affirmed.
Cox is in accord with a trend, in some jurisdictions, to extend the definition of
dwelling, from its strict common law meaning of the fixed place of abode of another, to
various structures and objects. However, little thought appears to have been given to
what some of these structures are in reality. The question arises whether a slippery slope
has been created, such that structures are considered to be dwellings when they truly are
not and individuals convicted of burglary are sentenced more harshly than they should
be. Query if a large cardboard box, used as overnight accommodations by a transient in
the inner city, can be the subject of burglary of a dwelling. Query if a boat in the
driveway, used as lodgings by an errant spouse, banished from the bedroom, can be the
subject of burglary of a dwelling. Query if a mountain shelter, temporarily erected by a
hiking club and used as a place to spend the night in inclement weather, can be the
subject of burglary of a dwelling. Query if, in this case, a rented trailer, briefly situated
in the mountains for use during the deer hunt, can be the subject of burglary of a
dwelling.
At least two jurisdictions, considering whether a structure is a dwelling, treat
occupancy as significant, as Utah does. However, occupancy is not controlling. These
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jurisdictions also view, as very important, the attributes of the structure, in particular its
permanency.
Virginia has considered the matter extensively. The rule that has emerged there is
that "in order for a structure to be the subject of burglary, [it] must be permanently
affixed to the ground so as to become part of the realty at the time of the unlawful entry."
Dalton v. Commonwealth, 418 S.E.2d 563, 565 (Va. App. 1992). Thus, a chicken
house may be the subject of burglary. Compton v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E.2d 446, 449
(Va. 1949). However, a converted school bus, not permanently affixed to the ground,
may not be. Crews v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Va. App. 1987). An office
trailer, permanently affixed to the ground, may be the subject of burglary. Buie v.
Commonwealth, 465 S.E.2d 596, 598 (Va. App. 1996). Significantly, the trailer, in
Buie, rested on blocks positioned along its underside, had fixed steps from the ground to
an elevated doorway, was surrounded by a secure fence, and was serviced by electricity.
Id. at 597-98. But a trailer, not permanently affixed to the ground, may not the subject
of burglary. Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 698, 739-40 (Va. 1985).
Missouri also has considered the matter in depth. Two cases from that jurisdiction
are particularly instructive. State v. Ryun, 549 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Mo. App. 1977), holds
that a house trailer or mobile home, which was the sole place of abode and living
quarters of occupants, was a "dwelling house" within the meaning of the burglary statute.
Defendant contended that the trailer was not a dwelling and that he improperly was

9

convicted of burglary of a dwelling. However, the court rejected the argument. It
determined that the trailer was a dwelling because it had not been moved since being
towed to its resting place three years before, it was skirted from floor to ground to block
air circulation and drafts, and it was connected to an electricity transmission line. Id. On
the other hand State v. Scilagy, 579 S.W.2d 814, 819 (Mo. App. 1979), holds that a
forty-foot semitrailer, despite the fact that it contained a bedroom facility which was used
for that purpose, could not be the subject of burglary. The trailer was parked at a
shopping center and part of carnival that went from place to place. At the time of the
offense, to-wit a break-in and theft of a cash bag, the trailer was on wheels and fully
mobile and it was not equipped for water or sewer hookup. Id. at 816-17. The court
expressly contrasted the semitrailer with the victims' trailer in Ryun. At 819.
On the basis of these cases from other jurisdictions, Cates believes that not only
the purpose of a structure but its physical attributes and characteristics should be
considered in determining, in Utah, whether that structure is a dwelling within the
meaning of the burglary statute. There is arguably support for this position in the very
language of the statute. A "dwelling" is "a building which is usually occupied by a
person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-201(2). However, a "building" includes, in its definition, "any ... trailer ...
or vehicle adaptedfor overnight accommodation of persons ...." Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-201(1) (emphasis added). The plain meaning is that any trailer used for sleeping
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overnight is a building, not dwelling. Any interpretation to the contrary is erroneous. "A
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that unambiguous language in the
statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning." Johnson v.
Utah State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, burglary
committed in a dwelling, where people live and sleep, is a second degree felony, but
burglary in a trailer, despite the fact that people may be sleeping there, is only a third
degree felony.
The distinction that Cates is making is one that the State itself draws in Utah Code
Ann. § 23-20-1(2), though admittedly in another context. Conservation officers, who
have police powers, may engage in warrantless searches of "vehicles, camps, or other
places," including no doubt trailers located in the mountains during hunting season, if
there is probable cause to believe that illegally taken wildlife is contained in those
locations. However, officers may execute searches of "an occupied or unoccupied
dwelling" only if they first obtain a warrant. A trailer and a dwelling are recognized as
being quite different. Were a citizen to challenge warrantless police search of his trailer,
briefly situated in the mountains for use during the deer hunt, the State certainly would
argue that he had no Fourth Amendment or article I, section 14 protection because a
trailer is not a dwelling within the meaning of the law.
There is irony here, and it goes further. That courts should take into account not
just occupancy of a structure, but its physical attributes and characteristics, is an
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argument advanced by the government in justifying warrantless intrusion into citizens'
living quarters by armed, sometimes masked men, namely police in search and seizure
cases. If the living quarters do not possess what California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985), refers to as 'the attributes of a home," an exception to the general warrant
requirement may exist. It did exist in Carney. The United States supreme court
determined that respondent's mobile home, which was the subject of a warrantless police
search for drugs, had more of the characteristics of an automobile than a home. It was,
for example, on wheels and easily could have been moved beyond the reach of police.
Whether trailers or mobile homes are dwellings, in search and seizure cases, is a
fact-intensive question. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.2 (1996). Specific matters to inquire into
include whether the trailer was readily mobile, whether it was subject to government
regulation and control as a vehicle or house, whether it was in a place regularly used for
residential purposes, whether it was connected to utilities, and whether it was in a place
open to the public and available for public use. Significantly, in this case, application of
such factors clearly suggests that Sunkees' trailer should not be considered to be a
dwelling within the meaning of the burglary statute. It was mobile, not affixed to the
ground or otherwise permanently placed in its location. Indeed it was only briefly
situated in the mountains, for use during the deer hunt, and to be returned to the dealer
afterwards. Presumably it was a vehicle, not a house, and licensed as a vehicle. It was in
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a remote spot in the mountains, in a place not regularly used for residential purposes.
There is no evidence that it was connected to utilities. It was not connected to a phone
line; Sunkees used his cellphone to call police. Finally, as the trailer was located in the
mountains, for the deer hunt, it was in a place open to hunting, that is, a place available
for use of the general public with hunting licenses and permits.
Arguably, therefore, the court of appeals should add to the only criterion used in
Cox to determine whether a structure is a dwelling, that is, the purpose for which it is
used, to include the physical attributes and characteristics of the structure. Two criteria,
nighttime occupancy and attributes of a home, should be used simultaneously for
purposes of analysis. If both are present, the structure in question should be deemed to
be dwelling under the burglary statute. However, if both are not present, the structure
should be considered to be a building. Attributes of a home are necessary because, as
the burglary statute even now recognizes, a trailer as well as a dwelling can be used for
overnight occupancy but a trailer and a dwelling are clearly distinguishable. Cases from
other jurisdictions hold that, for the crime of burglary of a dwelling to lie, a structure
must possess certain attributes, in particular permanency. Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1(2)
differentiates between movable (vehicles, camps, etc.) and immovable (dwellings) places,
in wildlife search and seizure cases, reminding us that the law does regard, as important,
the nature of a structure, not just whether people may be sleeping inside it. The degree
to which structures such as trailers and mobile homes are or are not like dwellings is an
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important and recurrent issue in search and seizure cases generally, with application,
Cates believes, to this case.
In short, for the reasons set forth above, the trial court erred in interpreting the
burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, to include Sunkees' trailer within the
meaning of a "dwelling." The trailer was a "building," not "dwelling." Cates should
have been convicted of third degree rather than second degree felony burglary.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals should reverse Cates' conviction on count (II), burglary of a
dwelling, a second degree felony, and remand his case to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with its opinion.
DATED this ^

day of November, 1999.

VASc*
WESLEY M. BADEN
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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NO ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1), Utah R. App. P., notice is given that no addendum to
the brief of the appellant is necessary.
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